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Abstract
Random walk is one of the basic mechanisms found in many network appli-
cations. We study the epidemic spreading dynamics driven by biased ran-
dom walks on complex networks. In our epidemic model, each time infected
nodes constantly spread some infected packets by biased random walks to
their neighbor nodes causing the infection of the susceptible nodes that re-
ceive the packets. An infected node get recovered from infection with a fixed
probability. Simulation and analytical results on model and real-world net-
works show that the epidemic spreading becomes intense and wide with the
increase of delivery capacity of infected nodes, average node degree, homo-
geneity of node degree distribution. Furthermore, there are corresponding
optimal parameters such that the infected nodes have instantaneously the
largest population, and the epidemic spreading process covers the largest
part of a network.
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1. Introduction
Unexpected outbreak of many epidemics in biological systems[1, 2] and
the spread of viruses in technology systems[3, 4, 5] result in a lot of death
or great damage in related systems. The study of epidemiological mod-
els has a long history, especially in the field of social science[6, 7]. The
SIR (susceptible-infected-removed) model and the SIS (susceptible-infected-
susceptible) model are two representative models which capture the basic
properties of epidemic spreading through the transition among several dis-
ease states[8, 9]. In SIR model, a susceptible individual will become infected
with certain rate when it has contact with infected individuals. An infected
individual will get immunity to the disease or die at some constant rate,
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and becomes a removed node which means it can not get infected again.
Therefore, the spread of disease will terminate when all the infected individ-
uals are removed from the disease. Differently in SIS model, there are just
two states, susceptible and infected. A recovered individual can get infected
again. If the fraction of infected individuals is large enough the disease will
spread indefinitely, otherwise it will die out after sometime. Initially, the epi-
demic models are considered under the homogeneous mixing hypothesis[10],
in which it assumes that each time an arbitrary individual has an equal op-
portunity to contact with everyone else in the population. Later, results from
network science community demonstrate that most real-world networked sys-
tems have heterogeneous topological structures[11, 12, 13], and this greatly
promote many mathematicians and physicists to explore epidemic models
on heterogeneous random networks[14, 15, 16, 17] by means of mean-field
approximation[18, 19, 20], generating functions formalism[21] and percola-
tion theory[22]. It was found that for random networks with strongly het-
erogeneous degree distribution, like many real-world networks, the epidemic
threshold is absent, which means epidemics always have a finite probability
to survive indefinitely[11, 18].
Besides of topological properities, traffics in networks also have great im-
pacts on the epidemic spreading. For instance, in the Internet computer
viruses transmit from a node to another one with data packets. Without
transmission of packets, viruses can not spread even if the two nodes are
physically connected. Another example is the air traffics speed the spread of
disease among different spatial areas. The combination between epidemic
spread and traffic dynamics were first considered in the metapopulation
model[23] which characterizes the dynamics of systems composed of sub-
populations. Then, Meloni et al[24] studied the impact of traffic dynamics
on the spread of virus in the Internet, in which the information packets are
transmitted with the shortest path protocol. Later, many mechanisms were
proposed to suppress the traffic-driven epidemic spreading, for instance con-
trolling the traffic flow[25], the routing strategy[26, 27], or the heterogeneous
curing rate[28], deleting some particular edges[29], etc.
Random walk is one of the basic mechanisms related to spreading processes[30,
31, 32]. For example, a mobile phone virus may randomly dial some phone
numbers from the directory. Some computer viruses propagate randomly by
email or other online communication tools. Therefore, the role of random
walks in the epidemic spreading should be explored. We propose an epidemic
model driven by biased random walks. In our model, an infected node sends
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infected packets at a constant rate to its neighbor nodes through biased
random walks. A susceptible node gets infected after receive the infected
packets, and will be removed from the set of infected nodes with a constant
rate. We inverstigate the spreading dynamics, the optimal control parameter
of our model and the influence of network topologies on our model.
2. SIR model
We improve the traditional SIR model by incorporating the traffic dynam-
ics driven by random walks. The SIR model is one of the traditional epidemic
spread models in literature. In the SIR model, there are three types of nodes
including susceptible nodes, infected nodes and removed nodes. A suscep-
tible node is susceptible to epidemics. An infected node is already infected
by the epidemic. A recovered node is the one that is removed from the set
of infected nodes. Assume the numbers of susceptible, infected and removed
nodes at time t are denoted as S(t), I(t) and R(t) respectively. There are
three basic elements in the SIR model as follows[8]:
(1) Assume the number of nodes in the network is fixed to N . Then N =
S(t) + I(t) +R(t) for all t.
(2) At time t, an arbitrary infected node infects the susceptible nodes by a
ratio β. Then the increased number of infected nodes at t is β∗s(t)∗I(t).
(3) At time t, the number of infected nodes removed is proportional to the
total number of infected nodes I(t), which is λ ∗ I(t).
According to the three elements, the dynamics of the SIR model can be
expressed as follows[8]:


dI
dt
= βSI − λI,
dS
dt
= −βSI,
dR
dt
= λI.
(1)
When time t is large enough, all the infected nodes will eventually becomes
removed nodes, and the epidemic spreading stops.
The SIR model is based on the assumption that a node has equal prob-
ability to contact with every other node in a network. However, in real
situations, individuals often have heterogeneous numbers of contacts[11]. A
few individuals have large number of contacts which will get more contacts
according to the rich-get-richer mechanism, while most of the individuals
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Figure 1: Illustration of the transitions among the susceptible, infected and removed nodes
in our model.
have a few contacts. Especially in the Internet, the epidemic can not spread
from a node to another node unless there is transport of infected packets
between the two nodes. Additionally, in city networks even the cities are
physically well connected, an epidemic can not spread among cities unless
individuals who get infected by the disease move among the cities. Therefore,
epidemics are often correlated with traffics for their spreading.
3. Epidemic model driven by biased random walks
We consider the traffic dynamics driven by biased random walks in the
epidemic spreading process. In our model, each time an infected nodes will
delivery constantly C infected packets to its neighbor nodes through biased
random walks. If an infected or removed node receives the packets, it will
drop the packets. If a susceptible node receives the packet, it becomes an
infected node and starts delivering infected packets from next time step.
An infected node has the probability λ to become a removed node. The
transitions among susceptible, infected and removed nodes are shown in Fig.
1.
3.1. Dynamics of our model
Assume an arbitrary infected node a which has 〈K〉 neighbor nodes. 〈K〉
is the average node degree of the network. The degrees of a’s neighbor nodes
are k1, k2, · · · , k〈K〉 respectively. According to the biased random walk mech-
anism, for a neighbor node i the probability that node a sends an infected
packet to node i is as follows:
Pai =
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
. (2)
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Where α is the control parameter of the biased random walk. When α = 0,
all the neighbor nodes have equal opportunity to receive an infected packet
delivered from node a which means they have equal probability to get in-
fected. When α > 0, nodes of larger degree have larger probability to receive
the packet. When α < 0, nodes of smaller degree have larger probability to
receive the packet. Since a send C infected packets each time, the probability
that node i will not receive any packets from node a is:
P¯ai = (1−
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C . (3)
Assume Xi is an random variable that represents the event that node i is
infected. Then Xi = 0 means node i hasn’t get any infected packet from
node a, and node i is not infected. Xi = 1 means node i has received at
least one of the infected packets from node a, and node i is infected. Then
we have: 

P (Xi = 0) = (1−
kαi
∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C ,
P (Xi = 1) = 1− (1−
kαi
∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C .
(4)
Then the expected value of Xi is:
E(Xi) = 1− (1−
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C . (5)
Assume a random variable Y that represents the number of neighbor nodes
infected by node a. Then the average value of Y is:
E(Y ) =
〈K〉∑
i=1
E(Xi)
= 〈K〉 −
〈K〉∑
i=1
(1−
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C . (6)
Where the sum is over all the 〈K〉 neighbor nodes of node a. However, in the
epidemic spreading process the neighbor nodes of node a may not be only
susceptible nodes. To effevtively estimate the number of neighbor nodes that
node a infects, we need to know the number of susceptible nodes among all
the neighbor nodes of node a. To estimate the total number of new infected
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nodes at time t, we count the ratio µ of susceptible nodes among neighbor
nodes of infected nodes in the network, which is as follows:
µ =
∑I(t)
j=1 nj∑I(t)
j=1 kj
≈
〈n〉
〈K〉
. (7)
Where nj is the number of susceptible nodes among the neighbor nodes of
an infected node j. 〈n〉 represents the average number of susceptible nodes
among all the neighbors of infected nodes at time t. According to Eq. 6 and
Eq. 7, the total new infected nodes at time t is:
Inew(t) ≈ E(Y ) ∗ µ ∗ I(t)
≈ (〈K〉 −
〈K〉∑
i=1
(1−
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C) ∗
〈n〉
〈K〉
∗ I(t). (8)
Combining Eq. 1 with Eq. 8, we get the dynamics equations of our model
as follows:


dI
dt
= (〈K〉 −
∑〈K〉
i=1(1−
kαi
∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C) ∗ 〈n〉
〈K〉
∗ I(t)− λI,
dS
dt
= −(〈K〉 −
∑〈K〉
i=1(1−
kαi
∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C) ∗ 〈n〉
〈K〉
∗ I(t),
dR
dt
= λI.
(9)
We study the behaviours of S(t), I(t) and R(t) with increase of time t on a
large-scale scale-free network. In Fig. 2, S(t) decreases abruptly, and then
saturates with t. I(t) increases with t, then decreases with t, and finally
saturates. There is a peak of I(t) that corresponds to the instantaneous
maximum population of infected nodes. R(t) increases abruptly, and then
saturates with t, which is opposite to S(t). When t is large enough, the
epidemic spreading process stops, and R(t) is number of all the nodes that
have ever been infected and removed finally from the disease. The trends
of the curves for biased random walks of α = −1 are similar with that of
simple random walks of α = 0. Also, the simulation results and the analytical
results obtained from Eq. 9 are consistent, as shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: S(t), I(t), and R(t) vs. t for α = 0 and α = −1. A randomly selected node is
set to be infected initially. Delivery capacity of infected nodes is C = 5. λ = 0.1. The
network is generated by the static model[33]. The parameters are N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 5,
and γ = 2.5.
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Figure 3: S(t), I(t), and R(t) vs. t for various delivery capacities C. A randomly selected
node is set to be infected initially. α = 0. λ = 0.1. The network is generated by the static
model. The parameters of the network are N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 5, and γ = 2.5.
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Figure 4: S(t), I(t), and R(t) vs. t for various α. A randomly selected node is set to be
infected initially. C = 5. λ = 0.1. The network for (a), (b) and (c) is generated by the
static model. The parameters of the network are N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 5, and γ = 2.5. The
Epinions network for (d), (e) and (f) has 75, 879 nodes and 508, 960 edges.
3.2. Factors of our model
Delivery capacity C of infected nodes is a critical factor in our epidemic
spreading model. The larger the delivery capacity of an infected node, the
more susceptible neighbor nodes an infected node will likely infects each time.
When C →∞, Inew(t)→ 〈n〉 ∗ I(t). Then Eq. 9 is reduced as follows:


dI
dt
= 〈n〉 ∗ I(t)− λI,
dS
dt
= −〈n〉 ∗ I(t),
dR
dt
= λI.
(10)
We show simulation results of S(t), I(t) and R(t) for different value of C in
Fig.3. Clearly, the larger C, the faster S(t), I(t) and R(t) convergence, and
the epidemic spreads. The larger C, the larger population of nodes that has
ever been infected which is inferred from S(t) and R(t) when t is large enough.
The larger C, the larger instantaneous population of infected nodes which is
indicated from the peak of I(t). The parameter α is another key factor in
our epidemic model which determines the probability that the neighbors of
an infected node get infected when C is a limited constant. In Fig. 4, we
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see that α is correlated with the instantaneous maximum number of infected
nodes Ipeak, and the range of the spread that is reflected by the ultimate
number of removed nodes Rend. α = −1 corresponds to a larger Ipeak and
a larger Rend than α = 0 and α = 1. This indicates that random walks
biased on small-degree nodes favors the epidemic spreading which is hold
for the model network and the Epinions network, as shown in Fig.4. Then
we investigate the optimal parameters αopt that lead to the maximum Ipeak
and the maximum Rend on the model network and the Epinions network.
In Fig.5, we see Ipeak and Rend as a function of α. Clearly, Ipeak and Rend
increase with α first, then decrease with α respectively. There are αopt that
correspond to maximum Ipeak and maximum Rend respectively. We present
the results of maximum Ipeak, maximum Rend, and the corresponding αopt for
some real-world networks, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: maximum Ipeak and maximum Rend with corresponding optimal parameters α
for real-world networks. C = 5. λ = 0.1.
NAME NODES EDGES Ipeak αopt Rend αopt
Oregon-1 10790 22469 2903.33 -0.4 6010.37 -0.8
Gnutella 62586 147892 37833.43 -0.8 58155.71 -1.4
Epinions 75879 508837 35274.13 -0.8 61560.15 -1.2
Wiki-Vote 7115 103689 4294.22 -1 6623.23 -1.4
Yeast 2361 7182 1314.21 -0.8 2214.63 -1.2
email-Enron 36692 183831 12789.5 -0.8 24254.25 -1.4
Facebook 4039 88234 2105.11 -0.8 3920.21 -0.4
Geom 7343 11898 1778.5 -0.4 3202.5 -1
Political blogs 1222 19021 813.26 -1.2 1192.14 -2.2
Power grid 4941 6594 1278.36 0.4 4304.27 -0.2
4. Impacts of networks structures on our model
We investigate the influence of topological properties of complex networks
including average node degree and degree distribution, on the behaviors of
our epidemic spreading model. We focus on the spontaneous number of
infected nodes Ipeak and the final population of nodes that have ever been
infected Rend, as well as the related optimal parameters αopt. According Eq.
9
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Figure 5: Ipeak and Rend vs. α. A randomly selected node is set to be infected initially.
C = 5. λ = 0.1. The networks are the same as in Fig. 4. The results are the average of
100 independent runs.
6, we have:
E(Y ) = 〈K〉 −
〈K〉∑
i=1
(1−
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)C
= 〈K〉 −
〈K〉∑
i=1
(1− C
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
+
C(C − 1)
2
(
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)2 − · · ·)
=
〈K〉∑
i=1
(C
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
−
C(C − 1)
2
(
kαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
)2 + · · ·). (11)
When 〈K〉 → ∞, we get:
E(Y ) ≈
〈K〉∑
i=1
Ckαi∑〈K〉
j=1 k
α
j
≈ C (12)
Eq. 12 means that generally the number of nodes that an infected nodes
infects in one time step increases with average degree 〈K〉, and tends to C,
which is further confirmed in Fig. 6. Also, for the whole epidemic spreading
process, the maximum Ipeak and the maximum Rend increase substantially,
then saturate with 〈K〉 respectively, as shown in Fig. 7 and 8. Their corre-
sponding optimal parameters αopt are generally negative and decrease with
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Figure 6: E(Y ) vs. 〈K〉 obtained from Eq. 6.
〈K〉. This indicates that when the networks become dense, random walks
should be more biased on small-degree nodes to make the epidemic spread-
ing more intense and wide. These results are consistent both for random
networks (Fig. 7) and scale-free networks (Fig. 8). We also investigate
the impact of degree distribution on the epidemic spreading dynamics. In
Fig. 9, the maximum Ipeak and the maximum Rend increase abruptly, then
saturate with γ respectively, and this means when the degree distribution
becomes homogeneous, the spread of the epidemic becomes more fierce and
wide in the network. The optimal parameters for Ipeak and Rend increase with
γ. This indicates when the network becomes homogeneous, the extent that
random walks are biased on small-degree nodes to get a wide and fierce epi-
demic spreading decreases. need less However, the fluctuations in the curves
are clear.
5. Conclusions and discussions
In summary, we investigate the epidemic spreading on complex networks
including model networks and real-world networks. In our model, the epi-
demic spreading goes with packets transmission driven by biased random
walks. Analytical and simulation results demonstrate that Epidemic spread-
ing becomes fierce and wide with increase of delivery capacity of infected
nodes, average node degree, and the homogeneity of the network. The opti-
mal parameters of the biased random walks in epidemic spreading are gener-
ally negative values. This means the random walks are biased on small-degree
nodes to make an intense and wide spread of the epidemic. However, the bi-
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Figure 7: αopt and the corresponding Ipeak and Rend vs. 〈K〉 for random networks.
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Figure 9: αopt and the corresponding Ipeak and Rend vs. power-law parameter γ. The
networks are generated by the static model, the network size is N = 5000, and the average
node degree is 〈K〉 = 5. A randomly selected node is set to be infected initially. C = 10.
λ = 0.1. The results are the average of 104 independent runs.
ased random walks are based on only degrees of the nearest neighbor nodes
in our model. The effects of biased random walks with more topological
information on the epidemic spreading still need to be explored.
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